The Industrial Control System Cyber Defence Triage Process by Cook, Allan et al.
The Industrial Control System Cyber Defence Triage
Process
Allan Cook, Helge Janicke, Richard Smith, Leandros Maglaras
Cyber Technology Institute, De Montfort University, Leicester, LE1 9BH, UK
Abstract
The threat to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) from cyber attacks is widely
acknowledged by governments and literature. Operators of ICS are looking to
address these threats in an effective and cost-sensitive manner that does not
expose their operations to additional risks through invasive testing. Whilst
existing standards and guidelines offer comprehensive advice for reviewing
the security of ICS infrastructure, resource and time limitations can lead to
incomplete assessments or undesirably long countermeasure implementation
schedules.
In this paper we consider the problem of undertaking efficient cyber se-
curity risk assessments and implementing mitigations in large, established
ICS operations for which a full security review cannot be implemented on
a constrained timescale. The contribution is the Industrial Control System
Cyber Defence Triage Process (ICS-CDTP). ICS-CDTP determines areas of
priority where the impact of attacks is greatest, and where initial investment
reduces the organisation’s overall exposure swiftly. ICS-CDTP is designed to
be a precursor to a wider, holistic review across the operation following estab-
lished security management approaches. ICS-CDTP is a novel combination
of the Diamond Model of Intrusion Detection, the Mandiant Attack Lifecycle,
and the CARVER Matrix, allowing for an effective triage of attack vectors
and likely targets for a capable antagonist. ICS-CDTP identifies and focuses
on key ICS processes and their exposure to cyber threats with the view to
maintain critical operations. The article defines ICS-CDTP and exemplifies
its application using a fictitious water treatment facility, and explains its
evaluation as part of a large-scale serious game exercise.
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1. Introduction
Modern Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have evolved from isolated en-
vironments that traditionally had no external connectivity to integrated ar-
chitectures. This integration is business driven, with the objective to ex-
ploit the value of operational data to maximise efficiencies and streamline
supply chains. Most ICS systems are optimised for performance, and were
historically not designed to defend against unauthorised or malicious use.
Typical ICS architectures comprise a mix of operational technologies (OT)
that include field measurement and control devices integrated with estab-
lished information technology (IT) supervisory applications. OT is often
based on proprietary hardware and protocols, complicating risk assessments
and the development and deployment of counter measures. ICS are deter-
ministic real-time systems that operate within strict latency boundaries to
ensure operation of critical industrial processes found in chemical process-
ing or power generation. Once installed and certified for safety compliance,
these systems are rarely updated, as the risk of unexpected behaviours as a
result of modification is perceived as high and testing on dedicated off-line
facilities is prohibitively expensive. As a consequence the deployed devices
often remain in operation for 10-20 years with little modification [1, 2, 3, 4].
Regular security or functional updates that are common to the modern IT
are not commonly deployed in these infrastructures making them exceptional
vulnerable to attack. The maintenance of availability, reliability and safety
of an ICS is a priority, and any downtime to install upgrades, patches, or
add security features that may assist in the response to a cyber incident, are
uncommon [5, 6].
There is evidence [7, 8] that targeted attacks from capable actors look
beyond a IT system focus, and instead target directly the industrial processes
under control in order to create an effect that impacts on the operations of
an industrial facility. This attack on the critical processes represents the
highest level of threat to an ICS operator, especially when perpetrated by a
highly capable actor such as a nation state [9]. Any approach to security of
ICS hence should assume an intelligent, adaptable adversary that will focus
on high-value targets.
Traditional approaches to systems vulnerability assessment rarely focus
on antagonistic intent. Instead they review penetration and exploitation
options, highlighting what is vulnerable as a result. A complete review of
a facility using the guidance in ISA-99 [10], soon to be replaced by IEC
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62443 [11], and the CPNI ICS Good Practice Guide [12] should result in a
comprehensive defence-in-depth approach to cyber security. However, such
comprehensive reviews are expensive, resource-intensive activities that often
cannot be justified purely based on a cost-benefit analysis.
In order to deliver the maximum return on investment for an initial cy-
ber review, and establish the basis for a subsequent complete assessment of
the operations, the potential financial and safety impacts of malicious at-
tack activity should be modelled to determine where the manipulation of
industrial processes and process data have the greatest impact. It is only
once the process vulnerabilities in the operational industrial processes have
been identified that we can establish which of the many devices within a
large ICS installation are responsible for the control of the vulnerable pro-
cess steps, and triage which are the highest priority to defend from cyber
attack, and against which we can build an incident response ’playbook’ to
deny the attacker access to critical system assets.
Whilst the total global automation market in 2012 was estimated to be
worth USD 152bn [13], the US ICS-CERT only responded to 138 incidents
[14]. Between October 2014 and September 2015 the number of incidents
had increased to 295 [15], but compared to the global value of the market,
and the inferred number of ICS installations worldwide, the frequency of
incidents remains low.
This relative infrequency is not proportionate to the potential impact. A
simulation of malware on the US electricity grid [16] resulted in blackouts
across 15 states, 93 million people without power, and impacts on the US
economy of between USD 243bn and 1trn. Such high-impact, low-frequency
(HILF) events [17] do not provide an adequate dataset to characterise the
threat and do not provide sufficient inputs to established risk analysis models
[18]. This lack of evidence complicates the cost-justification of investment in
ICS cyber security, as the costs can be high versus the demonstrated number
of incidents.
The ICS-CDTP framework described within this paper is focused on those
ICS operators facing the highest levels of impact from antagonistic cyber
actions, but are not yet at a high level of cyber security maturity. The intent
of ICS-CDTP is to begin a progression of informing and realising a set of ICS
security controls that will form the basis of subsequent, holistic analyses of
the entire industrial facility using established best practices.
ICS-CDTP framework is novel in that it combines and extends concepts
found in risk assessment and intrusion detection techniques with safety and
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process models that are known within the operations of many ICS facilities.
As such, ICS-CDTP:
1. Focuses on the identification and defence of critical ICS equipment from
malicious manipulation. It models and characterises attack behaviours
and support the development of a set of potential intrusion models that
significantly improve the readiness of incident responders.
2. Is intended to be complementary to IEC 62443 [11] and the CPNI ICS
Good Practice Guide [12]. It extends the Diamond Model of Intrusion
Analysis [19] and integrates the CARVER Matrix [20] to support a
fundamental change from reactionary, blanket protection to targeted
and focussed defence.
3. Allows ICS operators to actively identify and attempt to thwart mali-
cious attacks based on an incident response ’playbook’ developed from
analyses of antagonistic intent.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows:
ICS-CDTP Framework: We introduce ICS-CDTP and review how we char-
acterise the attractiveness of a target to an antagonist, and which questions
we must ask as a consequence to better inform incident response planning.
ICS-Cyber Defence Triage Process: We explain the stages of the ICS-CDTP
in detail, articulating how we integrate the Mandiant Attack Lifecycle with
the Diamond Model of Intrusion Detection, and how we extend the Dia-
mond Model to accommodate ICS equipment. We then proceed to explain
the CARVER Matrix as a method to triage critical systems, and show how
ICS-CDTP leverages a modified version of the CARVER Matrix to prioritise
which systems require an immediate focus for cyber defensive actions. We
proceed to illustrate how to address the protection of systems identified as
critical, and support the development of an incident response ’playbook’.
Evaluation: We explain how we have evaluated ICS-CDTP sufficiently to
demonstrate the feasibility of the framework to be taken forward to testing
on a large-scale, production ICS.
Conclusions: We discuss the evaluation, considering the limitations of the
testing environment to date, and propose future steps to develop ICS-CDTP
into a viable, cost-effective triage mechanism for ICS.
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2. The ICS-CDTP Framework
To date, there has been a lack of validated data against which we can
apply established risk models to ICS cyber threats [21, 18]. The ICS-CDTP
framework assumes that the courses of action an adversary will pursue when
attacking an ICS are unknown to the defender. Whilst some opportunist
antagonists may attempt to cause disruption without any conscious targets,
highly capable attacks will develop elaborate and coordinated attacks against
the highest value targets. By assuming a highly capable attacker the ICS-
CDTP framework considers a worst-case scenario driving the risk assessment.
Regardless of the premeditation of an attacker, an assessment of which
systems are critical to the continued operation of an industrial facility is
required. This includes the assessment of the vulnerabilities of the specific
control devices used and the infrastructure that underpins them with the aim
to establish attractive targets.
ICS-CDTP defines an attractive target as one that is: i) poorly protected,
either through inherent flaws in the device or weaknesses in surrounding
security mechanisms, ii) critical to the correct and profitable execution of an
operational process, iii) used in processes that, if manipulated, would result
in the local population or general public becoming aware of the intrusion,
iv) easily accessible via Internet-enabled devices, or poorly protected from
insiders through inadequate physical security. These characteristics focus on
the adversary’s perspective of the ICS infrastructure, and their attack intent.
Targets that satisfy these criteria would offer a means by which a capable
antagonist could achieve significant impact on an ICS [9].
ICS-CDTP (Fig.1), iteratively assesses the attractiveness of a device to
an antagonistic actor and provides a process to remediate any vulnerabili-
ties, as well as describing any residual risk and informing security monitoring
techniques for mitigation. However, analysis alone is not sufficient to ade-
quately defend an ICS, it must also support ongoing security monitoring to
better identify intrusions and underpin subsequent incident response. As a
result, this framework addresses eight questions:
1. Which devices are attractive to an attacker?
2. Can we better protect these devices?
3. What routes exist to these devices?
4. What events would occur in an attempt to access and manipulate these
devices?
5. Where can we deploy sensors to detect these events?
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6. How will we determine which of the alternate routes to a device are being
used by an attacker?
7. How can we predict an attackers next activity?
8. What does our incident response plan need to describe and test in order
to mitigate residual risks identified in the analysis?
3. ICS Cyber Defence Triage Process
The scale of ICS installations often complicates the cyber security analysis
process, as it is not cost-effective to defend all systems equally in such a
complex environment. Given the number of devices installed it is desirable
to prioritise the defence of those that support critical functionality. This
should include assessments from both offensive and defensive perspectives.





















Figure 1: ICS Cyber Defence Triage Process (ICS-CDTP)
Capable threat actors tend to follow established Advanced Persistent
Threat (APT) approaches to targets [22]. In 2014, 55 percent of incidents
investigated by ICS-CERT involved APTs or sophisticated actors [15]. In
order to maintain a focus on such antagonists we must first decide how to
represent the behaviours of an attacker. The triage framework illustrated in
Fig. 1 begins in Step 1 by deciding upon an attack lifecycle model that best
suits the perceived threat and available data. It then proceeds to gather doc-
umentation on the ICS network architecture in Step 2. Whilst information
obtained from network enumeration is always more accurate, ICS devices are
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known to react unpredictably to such exercises, and this will expose the oper-
ations of the facility to unnecessary risk. The network design documentation
is then used as a foundation for all subsequent analysis.
At this point, in Step 3, an assessment is made regarding the impact and
attractiveness of key processes to an antagonist, and the underlying ICS de-
vices, followed by a review of the possible attack threads that could permit
access to the ICS in Step 4. These attacker courses of action will, however, be
constrained by the characteristics of the ICS architecture implemented within
the facility. Accordingly, we consider the deployed infrastructure of the fa-
cility to increase the specificity of the analysis. By combining and analysing
the critical devices, attacker behaviours, and the deployed ICS architecture,
we produce a triage of the options available to an antagonist. This drives the
detailed security analysis of the critical devices in Step 5, either leading to
remediation of vulnerabilities, or where this is not possible, the identification
of indicators of compromise and the locations where network- and host-based
sensors can be deployed to support targeted security monitoring in Step 6.
Both options should feed into the overall incident response planning process
of Step 7, to underpin effective cyber defences against malicious attacks.
We will now consider each of the triage framework steps in greater detail.
The first step of the proposed framework defines how the antagonist’s
behaviour will be described, as a basis for subsequent analysis, by extending
the Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis [19] and integrating it with the
Mandiant Attack Lifecycle [22, 23]. The Diamond Model [19] is an analysis
framework that defines atomic intrusion events and describes the four core
features of an antagonistic event, those being an adversary using a capability
delivered over an infrastructure in order to target a victim and produce an
outcome (Fig. 2). These core features, or nodes, are connected by edges that
define the relationship between each. The nodes and edges are connected
into a model that resembles a diamond. The event also has a number of
meta-features that allow further details of an intrusion event to be modelled.
All attributes have an associated confidence level to allow a weighting to be
applied to decisions taken on the perceived accuracy of data. The advantage
of the model comes from the ability to analytically pivot between the con-
nected points on the diamond to reach other connected points, allowing, for
example, common capabilities being used in different intrusion events.
Rather than being defined as a specific ontology or taxonomy for mod-
elling attack behaviours, the diamond model is intended to be an extendable



























Figure 2: Diamond Model [19]
environment. As a result, an event in the model is a variable-sized n-tuple
that allows a basic tuple to be extended based on requirements.
The basic diamond event, along with the standard victim definition, is
depicted in Fig. 3.
There are many ways to express an antagonistic cyber attack. Two com-
mercial methods were considered during this analysis; the Lockheed Martin
’Kill-Chain’ [24] and the Mandiant Attack Lifecycle [22, 23]. Both techniques
fitted within the process, but in this example we used the Mandiant method,
as the ’Weaponisation’ phase of the Lockheed Martin model would be opaque
to a defender. The Mandiant lifecycle comprises eight stages:
1. External Reconnaissance: Network scanning and associated research
into the target organisation and systems.
2. Initial Compromise: The methods by which an attacker passes the se-
curity perimeter of the target network.
3. Establish Foothold: Techniques and capabilities to establish two-way
communications with implanted malware.
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E = <<Adversary, Confidenceadversary> 
         <Capability, Confidencecapability> 
         <Infrastructure, Confidenceinfrastructure> 
         <Victim, Confidencevictim> 
         <Timestamp-Start, Confidencetimestamp-start> 
         <Timestamp-End, Confidencetimestamp-end> 
         <Phase, Confidencephase> 
         <Result, Confidenceresult>
         <Direction, Confidencedirection> 
         <Methodology, Confidencemethodology> 
         <Resources, Confidenceresources>>
<Victim, Confidencevictim> = 
     <Organisation, Confidenceorganisation>
     <HostIPAddress, Confidence IP>
     <Hostname, Confidencehostname> 
     <Application, Confidenceapplication> 
     <TCPPort, ConfidenceTCPport>>
Figure 3: Basic Diamond Event and Standard Victim Definition[19]
4. Escalate Privileges: The means by which an attacker elevates their
permissions to a greater set of resources.
5. Internal Reconnaissance: Scanning and device discovery within the
target network.
6. Move Laterally: Traversion of the target network across legitimate de-
vices.
7. Maintain Presence: Ensuring continued control over key systems, nodes
and devices.
8. Complete Mission: The execution of the intent of the attack.
The lifecycle offers the ability to model the attack methods of an antag-
onist in a uniform manner to allow an assessment of behaviours towards the
intended target devices. However, in order to consider the feasibility of these
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attacker options we must also take into account the deployed architecture of
the ICS under analysis.
Security can be reduced through poor systems integration or inadequate
control over communications. As a result, the ICS devices cannot be con-
sidered in isolation from the network on which they are deployed. The sec-
ond step of the proposed framework investigates this deployed architecture.
Whichever way the architecture has been defined within the ICS operation,
whether that be through layering, grouping, functional separation etc., it
must feature in the triage framework so that we can review its impact and
determine common vulnerabilities that arise as a consequence of the design.
ICS are typically not deployed in a consistent manner, and therefore the
triage framework does not prescribe any defined abstractions. However, for
the purposes of explaining the triage process, we shall us the Purdue Model
of Control Hierarchy [25] as an illustrative architecture.
The Purdue model, a reference architecture for control hierarchy [25] that
describes six levels within an organisation managing an industrial control sys-
tem (Fig. 4). ICS implementations often include a number of significant dif-
ferences to traditional IT systems. Typically, ICS have a deeper architecture
than typical enterprises, as characterised by the Purdue model.
In order to accommodate the idiosyncrasies of ICS into the process we
must extend the definition of an event within the Diamond Model. Whilst
no mandatory elements are prescribed in the model, the infrastructure and
victim nodes should include the following levels of granularity to support a
detailed analysis of attack options.
Input Protocol: The protocol used to access the device.
Input Bearer: The bearer over which the input protocol runs, in order to
determine if it is shared.
Output Protocol: The protocol exiting the device, to accommodate pro-
tocol transformations.
Output Bearer: The bearer over which the output protocol runs, in order
to determine if it is shared.
Network Segment / Identifier: Which network or bus segment, or serial
identifier, is used to over the bearers.
Architecture Layer: Which layer or zone the segment sits within.
Target Device: The make and model of the device.
Target Device Address: Its address, whether IP, MAC or otherwise.
Target Device Port / Identifier: What port, or other identifier is used
to communicate with the device.
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Figure 4: Purdue Model for Control Hierarchy[25]
Hardware Revision: The hardware revision of the device.
Firmware Revision: The firmware revision of the device.
OS Revision: The operating system revision of the device.
Process: Which process the device is used within.
Process Step: Which specific step of the process.
Process Impact: The impact, potential or real, of manipulating the device.
Loss: The associated, assessed financial loss through manipulation.
Extensions to the Infrastructure and Victim nodes are represented in Fig.
5.
The Diamond Model then needs to be integrated with the selected attack
lifecycle (or ’kill-chain’ ), in this case the Mandiant Attack Lifecycle [22].
Fig. 6 shows a set of Activity Threads [19] with intrusion events modelled
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<Victim, Confidencevictim> = 
   <<TargetDevice, Confidencetgtdevice>
   <TargetDeviceAddress, Confidencetgtdevaddress>
   <TargetDevicePort/Identifier, Confidence tgtdevID> 
   <HardwareRevision, ConfidenceHWrevision> 
   <FirmwareRevision, ConfidenceSWrevision>
   <OSRevision, ConfidenceOSrevision>
   <Process, Confidenceprocess>
   <ProcessStep, Confidenceprocessstep>
   <ProcessImpact, Confidenceprocessimpact>
   <Loss, Confidence loss>>







Figure 5: Extensions to the Definition of Victim Infrastructure Nodes
as diamonds. Activity Threads, however, lend themselves more to intrusion
analysis activities, whereas we require a mechanism to develop attack routes
prior to the event, in order to develop our understanding of potential attack
paths.
Fig. 7 uses Activity Threads from a single adversary to model the various
options available to attack a victim device. The resulting Activity-Attack
Graph allows the various possible routes to the target, and the associated
events, to be modelled. The graph models, in a simple format, the alternative
paths that can be considered when assessing how to defend the target device.
It drives the definition of sensor and log alerts to inform on such behaviour.
Should an intrusion occur, the analysis is already mature as a consequence
of these models, and attacker next steps can be considered.
The third step of the proposed framework considers the intent and target
of an attacker.
In a forensic examination of the Stuxnet malware [7] that affected ura-
nium enrichment centrifuges, it was highlighted that the attack did not just



























Figure 6: Activity Threads [19]
process parameters in order to create an effect in the physical world. The
analysis highlighted that unlike cyber attacks on IT systems, cyber-physical
attacks involve the use of IT systems to spread malware and the manipula-
tion of ICS elements to influence the process under control that results in
damage to industrial equipment. This highlights the interdependencies of the
process and the control systems in use, and how one cannot be considered
in isolation from the other. Many industrial facilities utilise simulation tools
to model and predict the operations of the processes under control within
an ICS. This forms an essential part of the operations of the facility. These
models also offer the possibility to test boundary conditions of process vari-
able and determine which ones, if maliciously manipulated, could introduce
misbehaviour within the industrial process [8].
Most simulations are focused on a model of the control strategy for the
process and ensure the coherence of the overall plantwide process control
[26]. However, if conditions outside of this expected system state are intro-
duced, unanticipated consequences may be observed. For example, a change
in input flow into a recycle loop can result a ’snowball effect’ [27] with out-































Figure 7: Activity-Attack Graph [19]
entire plant may have to be shutdown in order to rectify the situation. This
demonstrates if the control equipment responsible for the input flow could
be maliciously manipulated, the impact on the plant could be significant.
The control device therefore becomes a key asset to defend, as an attacker
with knowledge of the industrial process under control may also determine
the efficacy of the device as a target [8]. Such semantic attacks can lead to
long-term degradation of product or services that impede on the effectiveness
and profitability of the operation.
Once the key vulnerable processes are defined, a further analysis of the
feasibility of interfering with the control elements that are used to manage
the parameters of the process, and highlight those that require remedial or
protective measures to prevent the occurrence of such misuse. One means
to identify areas of vulnerability that are potentially attractive to an antag-
onistic actor is the CARVER Matrix [20].
The US Department of Defense use the CARVER assessment method to
determine criticality and vulnerability in enemy infrastructures. CARVER
is a mnemonic for Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Ef-
fect and Recognisability. The method focuses on an adversary’s perspective
of the infrastructure to enable an analysis of the weaknesses of a target, or
the means by which its operations can be manipulated by an attacker [20].
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In this manner, the capabilities of several threat actors can be considered.
The output of the CARVER assessment is a critical-asset list that defines a
prioritised set of assets that are of value to an attacker based on their impor-
tance, whereby the asset’s incapacitation or destruction would have a serious
impact on the military operation or facility. The use of CARVER matrices to
consider threats to critical national infrastructure by civilian agencies when
preparing for terrorist attacks is emerging, as it allows organisations to con-
sider the relative desirability of targets, although its use has been limited to
the assessment of physical assets [28].
Criticality describes the level of importance the target has and its relative
value to an attacker in order to achieve a desired outcome, usually a denial
or degradation in the ability of a target to function.
Accessibility is an assessment of how an attacker could reach an asset and
the complexity of reaching the desired target.
Recuperability considers the time and resources required to repair or re-
place the target, or whether viable alternatives exist.
Vulnerability is a measure of the ability of attackers to deny or destroy the
targeted asset.
Effect articulates the impact of the loss or degradation of the target.
Recognisability is the extent to which a critical asset can be recognised
by an attacker, whether this be an understanding of its existence through to
knowing the detail of its location and configuration.
Each of the categories of the CARVER acronym are assessed for an asset,
using guidelines for a subjective assessment of the ratings, based on consis-
tent criteria described at the initiation of the analysis [29]. CARVER has a
standard set of criteria based on physical assets that have been refocused for
ICS triage, that will allow an ICS operator to determine their level of expo-
sure. The example in Table 3 illustrates how criticality is typically considered
using in the CARVER method:
Each of six domains of CARVER are considered in an unweighted assess-
ment, with the overall measure of their exposure based on a simple arithmetic
addition of the six values applied. Using the criticality criteria above we can
see how, if the processes of an industrial or critical infrastructure facility were
considered, the impact of their loss would become readily apparent. Take,
for example, a water supply utility [30] that takes its supplies from local
rivers, treats the water to remove impurities using standard control technol-
ogy, maintains a four-day storage capacity of treated water an distributes to
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Criticality Criteria Score Rating
Immediate termination of outcome; target cannot function
without it
9-10
Loss would reduce operational performance considerably, ot
two-thirds reduction in outcome
7-8
Loss would reduce operational performance, or one-third re-
duction in outcome
5-6
Loss may reduce operational performance, or 10 percent re-
duction in outcome
3-4
No significant effect on outcome 1-2
Table 1: A CARVER criticality assessment using standard criteria.
a local population via proprietary control technology. A CARVER analysis
of the processes may result in the assessment described in Table 2.
Process Name C A R V E R Total
Collection of water from rivers 7 4 3 5 7 5 31
Treatment of water 7 8 8 7 8 8 46
Storage of treated water 9 5 6 5 8 5 38
Distribution of water 8 7 6 5 8 3 37
Table 2: An example completed CARVER matrix for a water utility.
The storage of treated water appears a higher priority based on its crit-
icality, but the lower criticality of the treatment of water is amplified by
its apparent ease of access and use of standard technology that requires lit-
tle industry-specific expertise to understand. This triage process allows the
processes at the highest risk of being compromised to be addressed first.
Once the critical processes have been identified, the same approach can
be used to identify the control devices that manage and automate them. In
this manner, the scope of the analysis is immediately constrained to those
systems that support the vital operational processes and provides a necessary
triage. The CARVER method allows for existing, proven security methods to
be brought together in a complementary framework that allows the various
facets of the denial or degradation of an industrial control element to be
consistently evaluated. By analysing the control logic within the device it
is possible to determine which of the individual control elements, or the
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interactions between elements, are responsible for the key aspects of the
process under control. Such analysis allows an assessment of the ability of
the process to withstand variations in conditions and data during its lifetime.
This measure of robustness allows for the consequences of loss to be assessed
[31].
The criticality of a device depends upon its involvement with a key pro-
cess and whether or not it executes process logic or utilises process variables.
Either can be manipulated to result in adverse effects on the process. These
impacts can be assessed in two ways; firstly using safety analysis data, sec-
ondly using plant simulation data.
The Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) method is probably the most com-
monly used hazards analysis approach in industry [32]. Its widespread use
and acceptance has led to a large number of practitioners and supporting
service providers. The method divides systems under analysis into nodes,
each of which representing a section of the process that undergoes a signifi-
cant change or transformation. Examples of nodes include pumps, reactors,
heat exchangers etc. This information is generally extracted from Piping and
Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID) [32]. The size of a node is a subjective
decision based on the nature of the industrial process and may group devices
or system elements together in order to consider an overall process change
holistically. The groupings used for safety purposes are appropriate for an-
tagonistic cyber analysis purposes as they describe malfunctions, and allow
an assessment of impact and criticality should such conditions be wilfully
caused.
A HAZOP analysis follows a consistent process whereby a system node
is selected and its purpose and safe limits defined. Next, one of a set of
process guidewords are selected, such as high flow, low/no flow, reverse flow,
misdirected flow, high pressure, high temperature, polymerisation, wrong
composition etc., that describe the effect that should be considered, and
hazards and their causes are identified as a result. For each hazard, the
process considers how it will be recognised should it occur, and an estimation
of the consequences is reached. A set of safeguard requirements are then
defined, as is the estimated frequency of the hazard’s occurrence. Finally, the
hazards are ranked and a set of findings and recommendations is produced.
HAZOP analyses drive a rigorous assessment of the impact of undesirable
events on a process, decomposing to a detailed level. Their availability as
a mechanism to assess criticality provides a rich dataset on which to base
triage decisions. Where this data is not available, or when it has not covered
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sufficient breadth for cyber purposes, plantwide simulations used to model
the behaviour of the processes under control can be considered as a basis for
study. A study of a Vinyl Acetate Monomer (VAM) process [33] assessed the
vulnerabilities using an impact vocabulary that resembled a subset of the
HAZOP guidewords. The full use of the HAZOP vocabulary, however, offers
a structure by which the inputs, outputs, reaction vessels etc. of an industrial
facility can be analysed, using the simulation to visualise and quantify the
impact. Modification of the simulation to introduce financial variables will
also allow the monetary impact of manipulation to be quantified.
Once the key processes have been determined, the ICS control devices
that control the logic and variable used in the vulnerable process steps can
be further analysed. Within control systems, disturbances in the process
result in changes to process variables (PV) and represent the value sampled
for control. The measurement of the PV for the purposes of process control is
described as the Controlled Variable (CV), which is provided by a Primary
Element such as a sensor. The CV is compared to a setpoint within the
controller, generating an error, ’e’, representing the deviation from the desired
state. Based on this data the controller determines the necessary corrective
action, represented as a Manipulated Variable (mv) that drives the behaviour
of Final Control Elements such as a valve, that manipulate the mass or energy
entering the process. Those control devices that act upon CV and provide
logic to drive mv in the vulnerable process steps are deemed most critical
[34].
In order for a cyber attack to be successful, the targeted control device
must be accessible. Activity Threads [19] provide a formal way of represent-
ing the routes to a targeted control element. These are used to allow an
assessment of their ease of use.
A set of CARVER accessibility criteria, modified for applicability to ICS
triage, is described below. As with all of the CARVER factors described in
this process, they provide guidelines to shape the consistency of the assessor’s
thinking, but support a subjective measure that can be derived in relatively
short timescales. The accessibility criteria, modified from the original process
that focusses purely on physical access to a target, guides the assessor to
consider the ease with which an attacker might gain access to a critical system
of device, and the likelihood of existing security mechanisms detecting such
an event.
Recuperability is a measure of the control system element’s ability to
be replaced or repaired, and is a factor of the processes and procedures in
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Accessibility Criteria Score Rating
Remote or insider access with no means of identifying the
attacker
9-10
Remote or insider access with limited of identifying the at-
tacker
7-8
Remote or insider access is possible with limited auditing
and logging
5-6
Remote or insider access is possible with extensive auditing
and logging
3-4
Remote or insider access is extremely difficulty and will be
identified
1-2
Table 3: CARVER accessibility criteria modified for ICS cyber security assessment.
place to provide a working alternative to the original device. This includes
not only the replacement of the physical device, but the ability to load and
execute a verified copy of the configuration necessary to operate the process.
The recuperability measure can, if necessary, be tailored to the specifics
of the industry under analysis. Standard CARVER recuperability criteria is
applicable to ICS, and is described below. It guides the assessor to determine
how long it would take to remediate the loss of a critical system or device.
Recuperability Criteria Score Rating
Replacement, repair, or substitution requires 1 month or
more
9-10
Replacement, repair, or substitution requires 1 week to 1
month
7-8
Replacement, repair, or substitution requires 72 hours to 1
week
5-6
Replacement, repair, or substitution requires 24 to 72 hours 3-4
Same-day replacement, repair, or substitution 1-2
Table 4: Standard CARVER recuperability criteria.
The vulnerability of a control device can depend on a number of factors.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases provide a library
of known issues with control devices that can support an initial triage of
potential avenues for exploitation. A modified set of accessibility criteria
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that considers the capability of an antagonist is described below in order to
provide accommodation for industrial equipment.
Vulnerability Criteria Score Rating
Requires no industrial expertise; uses open source tools 9-10
Requires limited industrial expertise; uses open source tools 7-8
Requires extensive expertise; uses open source tools 5-6
Requires extensive industrial expertise and custom tools 3-4
Requires detailed knowledge of industrial facility and custom
tools
1-2
Table 5: CARVER vulnerability criteria modified for ICS cyber security assessment.
The effect of any cyber attack must be considered in the context of the
process and the physical elements involved. This is a factor of the simulation
and safety documentation review conducted in the criticality step of the
CARVER method, and is reviewed based on the following criteria, modified
for a critical infrastructure facility:
Effect Criteria Score Rating
Large-scale impact on services and revenues; noticeable to
public
9-10
Limited impact on services and revenues; noticeable to pub-
lic
7-8
Minor impact on services; minor impact on revenues; notice-
able to public
5-6
Minor impact on services; minor impact on revenues; public
unaware
3-4
Minor impact on services; no impact on revenues; public
unaware
1-2
Table 6: CARVER effect criteria modified for ICS cyber security assessment.
In order for an attack to be enacted upon a device it is necessary for the
threat actor to be aware of its existence and be able to identify it within
the control network. In order to assess the risk of knowledge of existence, it
should be ascertained how much of the control system architecture has been
made available on open source resources such as websites, and how much is
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freely discussed in communications by members of the facility’s supply chain
or maintenance service? The risk of identification of the device once on the
control network is dependent on the control environment’s ability to identify
device enumeration behaviours, and are dependent upon a knowledge of the
control network’s traffic profile [35, 36].
A modified set of accessibility criteria is described below:
Recognisability Criteria Score Rating
Requires no expertise to identify target device 9-10
Requires limited technical expertise to identify target 7-8
Requires moderate technical expertise to identify target 5-6
Requires significant technical expertise to identify target 3-4
Deception tactics deployed (honeypots etc.) 1-2
Table 7: CARVER recognisability criteria modified for ICS cyber security assessment.
The modified criteria of the CARVER matrix, criticality, accessibility, re-
cuperability, vulnerability, effect and recognisability permits the identification
and comparative ranking of ICS targets that would be attractive to a capa-
ble, antagonistic actor, in order to focus the efforts and resources of defensive
activities.
For the extent of the attack options to be considered, the fourth step of the
proposed framework takes each identified course of action and decompose it
further. This analysis must also take into account the deployed architecture.
Fig. 8. graphically presents a single Activity Thread, derived from
an Activity-Attack Graph, in a new visualisation that incorporates the de-
ployed architecture. The usual two-dimensional representation of an Activity
Thread is augmented by a third axis that shows the same attack distributed
across the layers of the deployed architecture. The strength of this extension
of the original model is that it allows common vulnerabilities or exploits to be
considered over architectural layers, identifying areas of security weakness,
or a concentration of potential attack behaviours, in individual layers. The
standard Diamond Model approach to this uses a two-dimensional model,
but this is again insufficient for an ICS. To allow the characteristics of a
deployed ICS architecture to be accommodated, we add a third axis to ar-
chitectural layers. This allows the defensive planners to review how to either
detect, delay, disrupt, degrade or deceive the attacker at each layer of the
architecture, considering the additional attributes defined in our extension
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Figure 8: Extended Activity Graph, incorporating the Deployed Architecture
The example shown in Fig. 10 models the following APT attack be-
haviour:
1. External reconnaissance of internet boundary devices locates an internet-
facing Third-party Access Server in the Enterprise Network.
2. An open, unprotected port is located and used to deliver an initial mal-
ware implant onto an unprotected File Server on the Site Business Planning
and Logistics Network.
3. The malware communicates with an external command and control server
and a fully-staged malware implant is deployed.
4. The malware uses a known operating system vulnerability to escalate its
privileges.
5. Internal reconnaissance of the network identifies an Enterprise Resource
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Planning (ERP) [37] system in the Site Business Planning and Logistics Net-
work.
6. The malware exploits the local network infrastructure to navigate to the
Manufacturing Execution System (MES) [38].
7. A beacon is deployed to the MES.
8. The beacon communicates with the command and control server via the
previously compromised internet-facing server and a fully-staged implant,
tailored to the device configuration, is deployed.
9. The malware performs reconnaissance of the OT network and identifies a
DCS that manages processes within the plant.
10. The malware exploits the network infrastructure to reach the DCS.
11. An initial implant is deployed on the DCS that beacons to the command
and control server.
12. The command and control server, communicating via the chain of com-
promised devices, delivers a fully-staged implant, tailored to the device con-
figuration.
13. The malware exploits a vulnerability in the DCS’s operating system to
escalate its privileges.
14. The malware modifies the configuration of the DCS in order to keep its
processes continually active.
15. The malware performs reconnaissance of the PLCs connected to the DCS
and exfiltrates this information.
16. The malware receives instructions from the command and control server
and forces a shutdown of a targeted PLC in order to stop a critical node in
the plant’s processing.
The results of the Attack Options Analysis feed into the final steps of the
proposed framework, supporting security testing and remediation, security
monitoring, and incident response planning.
For most large ICS it is not cost-effective to hold a pre-production envi-
ronment for the whole facility on which to test changes [39]. This presents
a challenge when testing against a representative system is required, as any
use of the live environment can result in unforeseen consequences. In order
to assess the levels of security available to the devices highlighted by the
CARVER matrix analysis, it is necessary to define a means by which testing
can be performed without risk to the operational environment. Step 5 of the
process presented in this paper proposes a three-stage approach to security
testing; 1. Simulated, 2. Isolated, 3. Synthesised:
Simulated: A process-centric approach to security testing that uses a
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simulation of the control device, modelling its logic, in order to assess the
behaviours of the control strategy if the measured values, process variables,
setpoints or sensor data are manipulated. The intent is to exceed normal
operating parameters to test boundary conditions, and observe their impact
on the process under control. The objective of this testing is not to test the
security of the device, but its resilience to abnormal data and assess the error
and boundary checks of the logic itself.
Isolated: A device-centric view of security that isolates a device identi-
fied as critical or attractive to an attacker, and assesses its inherent vul-
nerabilities. Preparation for isolated testing includes interrogating CVE
databases to identify security testing performed elsewhere. Isolated test-
ing should assess whether the recorded vulnerabilities are present within the
device under test. However, not all vulnerabilities are identified or recorded
within ICS equipment communities, so isolated testing should systematically
test the device to assess its security. Techniques such as STRIDE (Spoofing,
Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Eleva-
tion of Privilege) threat modelling approach [40] allow various methods of
driving a vulnerability, especially those enabled by devices that are insecure
by design. Depending on the licensing of the device, techniques such as
fuzzing may also be adopted.
Synthesised: An integration-centric set of test scenarios that assesses
any vulnerabilities introduced as a consequence of the integration of critical
or attractive ICS devices and components. A synthetic environment should
be created as a cyber testbed to assess the device or interrelated devices
in an architecturally representative environment that takes the output from
the simulated and isolated stages to produce the requirements for testing at
the synthesised stage. This allows the human aspect of control systems to
be considered, as the testbed permits operational procedures to introduced
to assess the operator’s response to various situations and industrial process
conditions. It also offers the additional benefit of supporting red teams to
further analyse the attack options available to an antagonist.
As the stages of the triage process iterate, the results feedback into the
ongoing analysis of the Deployed Architecture, Antagonistic Target Deter-
mination, and Attack Options Analysis steps, allowing remedial means to
address security vulnerabilities of be assessed. It also drives the development
of Security Monitoring strategies and Incident Response Plans.
Many older ICS devices are inherently insecure [39] and hardening may
not be viable. At this point the defensive analysis must move from the
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Figure 9: The Diamond Model Course of Action Matrix integrated with the Mandiant
Attack Lifecycle
A Course of Action (COA) Matrix [19] (Fig. 9) is developed from the
Activity Threads and Activity-Attack Graphs an determines how to detect,
deny, disrupt, degrade or deceive an attacker, as well as assisting in the anal-
ysis of where sensors should be deployed to identify antagonistic behaviours.
Hardening of devices, or strengthening the perimeter of a networked sys-
tem, are essential steps toward defending an ICS from malicious activity.
However, protective measures only serve to reduce the attack possibilities.
When dealing with an intelligent, adaptive adversary, it is necessary to con-
sider defensive plans to support any intrusion to allow in incident responders
to anticipate the antagonists next steps. The use of Activity-Attack Graphs
and COA matrices [19] considers the options available to an attacker, and
describes the characteristics of each attack event using a diamond model rep-
resentation, developing a set of ’competing hypotheses’ [41]. This provides
a basis to build an incident response ’playbook’ that can be iteratively im-
proved through table-top exercising and determine the most efficient means
to deny the attacker access to the critical system assets.
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4. Evaluation
For evaluation purposes, elements of the process were used in a cyber de-
fence exercise (CDX) [42] incorporating ICS devices and involving over 500
people. As the simulation steps of the process have been demonstrated by
the likes of Krotofil et al [33, 8], and require detailed process engineering
specialisms, recreating these experiments was deemed unnecessary. Isolated
testing of ICS devices has been widely acknowledged as a viable means of
assessing vulnerabilities of individual ICS devices [43, 44, 45], and again it
would not have enhanced the evaluation of the framework by repeating anal-
yses undertaken elsewhere. The CDX, however, provided a means by which
the synthesised elements of the process could be evaluated, as well as simu-
lating antagonistic actions against an ICS. During the CDX it was observed
that the use of the CARVER Matrix, with the modified assessment criteria
described in this paper, identified critical systems to the continued operations
of ICS facilities. However, this was initially limited to systems that provided
operational functionality, as opposed to technical infrastructure systems such
as domain controllers etc. The Diamond Model successfully tracked antago-
nistic events, using COA Matrices to determine multiple attack options, and
demonstrated how analysis of Activity Thread models (a vertical analysis of
the model) identified attacker progress through the networks being defended.
Similarly, the horizontal analysis of the Activity Models and Activity-Attack
Graphs identified common attack techniques across target networks, sup-
porting the sharing of threat intelligence across Blue Teams. This did not
prevent all Red Team activities, as systems were still compromised, but the
freedom of Red Teams actions was limited to systems not assessed as criti-
cal. Red Team progress toward these systems was observed to be slower than
towards non-critical systems that had not been proactively hardended, with
an increased deployment of network and host sensors.
However, whilst the techniques used in the CDX demonstrated their effec-
tiveness, they were largely paper-based, and required a significant investment
of resources and effort. As the CDX progressed, the manual maintenance of
paper-based data repositories became an increasing drain on Blue Team re-
sources, suggesting that support tools would be necessary to implement the
triage process at scale.
In summary, of the eight questions posed that this framework should
address, Table 8 describes how the various components described in this





1. Which devices are at-
tractive to an attacker?
CARVER Matrix The CARVER model supports the assessment of de-
vices that would have the most significant impact on
an ICS facility, and therefore those most attractive to
a capable APT actor.





Process simulation identifies process variable vulner-
abilities, which subsequently drives the isolated and
integrated security testing of the devices responsible
for using these variables.






The modelling of event threads and graphs supports
the assessment of routes towards the identified critical
devices.
4. What events would oc-
cur in an attempt to access





The same event threads and graphs that determine
the viable route toward a critical device are also used
to determine the antagonistic events that would occur
as as a result of an attack.
5. Where can we deploy




The positioning of sensors and IDS would be guided
by the event threads and graphs. The responses to
such event detection would then form the basis of an
incident response plan.
6. How will we deter-
mine which of the alter-
nate routes to a device are
being used by an attacker?
COA Matrix The sensor and IDS deployment would be based on
the possible routes to critical devices. Any alerts
would be cross-referenced to the COA Matrix to as-
sess which of the many possible COAs is likely to be
followed.






With the possible COAs established, the event
threads and graphs can be used to assess where along
the attack path the antagonist is currently positioned,
and therefore which steps must be achieved before the
critical device is compromised.
8. What does our inci-
dent response plan need to
describe and test in order
to mitigate residual risks
identified in the analysis??
CARVER, Process simula-
tion, device testing, syn-
thetic environments, secu-
rity monitoring and inci-
dent response planning
The CARVER Matrix will highlight the initial attrac-
tiveness of a system or device, and simulation and
testing will determine the extent of the associated
risks. This will shape the security monitoring posture
and incident response plans based on the ascertained
residual risk.
Table 8: ICS Triage Framework mapped to the questions posed
5. Conclusions
The triage framework presented in this paper provides a framework to as-
sess the attractiveness and criticality of ICS devices that underpin industrial
processes. As a validated dataset describing the nature of cyber attacks on
ICS is unavailable, it is based on subjective assessment of likely antagonistic
targets. However, the use of safety data and simulations to drive the criti-
cality assessment of key processes focuses on their impact on the industrial
facility’s ability to operate, and is based on a proven military and counter-
terrorism methodology, extended for ICS. This drives the identification of
those ICS devices responsible for the critical data measurements, calcula-
tions and control element manipulations that could be altered to achieve
antagonistic aims, and therefore which should be triaged for immediate se-
curity testing and remediation. The approach to testing, focusing on non-
destructive means that do not require access to the production environment,
does not expose the ICS operator to risks that arise as a consequence of
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unintended consequences of security activities.
The framework also accepts that whilst we might define the attractiveness
of a target, and identify the many routes towards it for exploitation, we
cannot know a priori which precise route the attacker will take, or how his
behaviours will change based on our defensive actions. By modelling the
many courses of action available to an antagonist and overlaying this onto
the deployed architecture we can determine the characteristics of malicious
behaviour in each segment or layer, and define the necessary signatures or
heuristics by which our sensors can identify the attack. We are also able to
provide security responders with a pre-incident assessment of the courses of
action available to an attacker, to assist in preventing them from reaching or
affecting the devices critical to the key processes of the industrial facility.
The triage framework is extendible to support synthetic environments
to drive game theoretic and red/blue team exercises to better understand
attacker option without subjecting the operational environment to the risks
of penetration testing. This would improve the overall attack dataset for
ongoing risk analysis.
The proposed framework, whilst providing a mechanism to focus security
efforts and expenditure, still requires significant analysis resources to de-
velop an initial understanding of the likely targets for an antagonist. For the
framework to be feasible for large ICS installations the required timescales
and manpower must be reduced in order for it to be cost-effective. Further
work in this area is identified as the development of software tools to reduce
the resources and timescale required, as well as expanding the use of safety
data to more rapidly inform the analysis of the impact of malicious manip-
ulation of ICS devices. Finally, the data generated as a result of the process
should be assessed for its viability to feed cyber attack risk models.
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